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In Bank.

Feb. 24,

WILLSON, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT

OF' SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent.
Arrest-Making Arrest.--,Vhere petitioner is shown to have
been taken into custody while engaged in the commission of
there is evidence that the requirements of Pen.
§§ 835,
relating to the manner of making an arrest,
Id.-Making Arrest.-vVhcre it may be inferred from the fact
petitioner was arrested in a public bar, but made no
outcry or objection, that she reali:ced that the arrt>sting
oft1cer was a police offict>r whose purpose was to make an
urrest, it is immaterial that petition£>r was not expressly informed of the officer's authority and purpose.
[3] Searches and Seizures-Time of Making.-If before a search
and seizure the officer was justified in making an arrest, it is
immaterial that the search and seizure preceded rather than
followed the arrest.
[4] Arrest-Without Warrant-Reasonable Cause.-Although information provided by an anonymous informer is relevant on
the issue of reasonable cause for making an arrest, in the
11hsence of some pressing emergency an arrest may not be
hused solely on such information, and evidence must be presented to the court that would justify the conclusion that
reliance on the information was reasonable.
[5] Id.- Without Warrant- Reasonable Cause: Searches and
Seizures-Justification for.-Although the fact that a police
officer found petitioner in a bar near a telephone standing
a scratch pad and a pencil with slips of paper in her hand
and petitioner, when the officer asked to see what was in her
attempted to conceal and dispose of it, would not con~titute reasonable cause to believe she was committing a
such conduct was sufficient to justify the officer's reliance on information previously given her of petitioner's
bookmaking, and under these circumstances the evidence be['ore the magistrate was sufficient to justify the conclusion that
n violation of Pen. Codr, § 337a, had been committed, th11t
Sec Cal.Jur., Arrest, § 21 et seq.; Am.Jur., Arrest, § 6.5 et seq.
See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Arrest, § 13; [3] Searches and
§ 1; [ 4 J Arrest, § 12; [ 5 J Arrest, § 12; Searches and
§1.
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cause before the search and
defendant was
and that the
and arrest were lawful.

to restrain the Superior
further in prosefor Appellant.
District Attorney (San Diego), and
District Attorney, for Respondent.
information petitioner Mona "Willson
with one count of occupying premises for the
purpose of horse-race bookmaking and one count of recordbet on a horse race. (Pen. Code, § 337a, subds. 2, 4.)
Her motion to set aside the information on the ground
that there is no reasonable or probable cause to believe she
committed the offenses eharged was denied (see Pen. Code,
§
, and she now seeks prohibition to prevent further proher. (See Pen. Code, § 999a.)
Petitioner contends that her commitment was based entirely on
evidence and that the peremptory writ
shoul<1 therefore issue. (See Rogers v. Superior Court, ante,
pp. 3, 6, 7
P.2d 929].)
At the
hearing, San Diego Chief of Police
Adam Jansen testified that on May 25th or 26th, 1955, a man
stopped him in the hallway of the police station. The man
appeared to know Chief Jansen, but Chief Jansen did not
know him and did not find out who he was or where he lived.
'l'he man told him that "there ·was a considerably large book
operation in progress in the Monte Carlo bar. . . .
He said he had been in the place; that he had observed it,
and he described what the operation was." Part of the information
concerned a ·waitress named Mona. 'rhe
man said that she would generally be found near the telo
that she occasionally answered it, and that she took
bets from customers in the place. "He said that the girl
Mona used food checks, restaurant checks. I gathered it was
t11e
tab that the waitress would make out when you
were served food from the way he described it. She wrote
the \Yagers on these slips, and that she had two pockets in
her--he didn't say uniform, he said she had two pockets,
one, I don't know which one, one contained money and the

2D3

was.
substance of the information
other
officers
in the company of three
Monte Carlo bar during the afternoon of ,J nne
purpose of the visit was to secure evidence of
such evidence was found, to make arrests. On enterthe bar, Officer Sunday observed
at
end of the bar. She ·was
a belt with a metal
that had the name "Mona" written on it. Ofllcer Suntestified that "She \Yas standing
the
and I
her at that point. When I came up to [peti, I observed on the bar a telephone, a small scratch
and a pencil. I stated to her--I noticed first that she
had something in her hand, appeared to be papers. I asked
her
I may see IYhat was in her hand. And as I said that,
these papers that were in her hand, she attempted to crumple
and extended her hand to the baek and to the side of
her.'' Officer Sunday totJk the papers from her hand and
then searched petitioner's pockets. Three slips of paper ·were
from petitioner's hand and another from he'' left
and approximately $270 in cash was found in her
other pocket. Officer Sunday then ash:ed petitioner to come
and she and another officer took petitioner to the
station. The officers were not in uniform and did not
themselves as such or inform petitioner expressly
that she was being arrested, and they did not have a search
or a warrant for petitioner's arrest. There was evithat the slips were registered bets on horRe.s running
ill races on the day that they were seized.
Section 835 of the Penal Code provides that ''An arrest
IS
by an actual restraint of the person of the defendant,
or
his submission to the custody of an officer. The defendant must not be subjected to any more restraint than
ifl necessary for his arrest and detention." Section 841 proYides that ''The person making the arrest must inform the
person to be arrested of tl1e intention to arrest him, of the
cause of the arrest, and the authority to make it, except
when the person to be arrested is actually engaged in the
commission of or an attempt to commit an offense, or is
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pursued immediately after its commission, or after an escape.''
[1] Since petitioner was taken into custody while apparently
engaged in the commission of an offense, there is evidence
that the requirements of these sections were met. [2] Moreover, since petitioner was arrested in a public bar, but made
no outcry or objection, it may be inferred that she realized
that Officer Sunday was a police officer and that her purpose
was to make an arrest. Under these circumstances, it is
immaterial that petitioner was not expressly informed of
Officer Sunday's authority and purpose. (See People v.
Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755,762-763 [290 P.2d 855], and cases cited.)
[3] Furthermore, if before the search and seizure, Officer
Sunday was justified in making an arrest, it is also immaterial
that the search and seizure preceded rather than followed
the arrest. (People v. Simon, 45 Cal.2d 645, 648-649 [290
P.2d 531] .)
Defendant contends, however, that before the search and
the arrest, Officer Sunday had no reasonable cause to believe
she had committed or was committing a felony (Pen. Code,
§ 836, subd. 3) and that the search and seizure were therefore unlawful. (See People v. Brown, 45 Cal.2d 640, 642-645
[290 P.2d 528] ; People v. Simon, supra, 45 Cal.2d 645, 647648; People v. Boyles, 45 Cal.2d j52, 655 [290 P.2d 535] .)
In People v. Boyles, 45 Cal.2d 652, 656 [290 P.2d 535],
we held that ''reasonable cause to justify an arrest may consist of information obtained from others and is not limited
to evidence that would be admissible at the trial on the issue
of guilt." Accordingly, the question presented is whether
the information given by the unidentified man to the chief
of police and passed on to Officer Sunday was sufficient in
the light of the other evidence to constitute reasonable cause
to believe that defendant was guilty of a felony. [4] Although
information provided by an anonymous informer is relevant
on the issue of reasonable cause, in the absence of some pressing emergency (see People v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 86, 92-93
[37 P. 799, 43 Am.St.Rep. 73] ), an arrest may not be based
solely on such information. (United States v. Kind, 87 F.2d
315, 316; United States v. Blich, 45 F.2d 627, 629; United
States v. Keown, 19 F.Supp. 639, 646; State v. Arregui, 44
Idaho 43 [254 P. 788, 793-794, 52 A.L.R. 463]; Hill v. State,
151 Miss. 518 [118 So. 539, 540] ; Smith v. State, 169
Tenn. 633 [90 S.W.2d 523, 524] ), and evidence must be
presented to the court that would justify the conclusion
that reliance on the information was reasonable. (See People
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supra, 45 Cal.2d 652, 656 (290 P.2d 535] .) In
cases the identity of, or past experience with, the informer may provide such evidence (see Aitken v. White, 93
'"'L"'-"!J'-'·"'"' 134, 145 [208 P.2d 788]), * and in others it may
i:!L<!JI#•~u by similar information from other sources or
personal observations of the police. In the present
the identity of the informer was unknown, the San Diego
had had no previous experience with him indicating
information was reliable, and the source and character
other information with respect to bookmaking at the
Carlo bar was not sufficiently revealed to permit its
We must consider, therefore, whether the evidence
Ahe'""'''"'n by Officer Sunday in the bar before the search was
::>wlllv""'·'~ to justify her reliance on the information that she
received.
Petitioner was found in the bar near the telephone
the informer had stated she would generally be. Since
innocent conduct could be known, however, to anyone
frequented the bar, it is doubtful whether its verification
would justify reasonable reliance on the additional inlnr.t<l>LJluu charging petitioner with bookmaking. In addition,
Officer Sunday observed petitioner standing by a
pad and a pencil with slips of paper in her hand.
'""'.,.,.<,.,..,. to Chief Jansen's assumption, the pad was not a
of ordinary printed checks given to customers, but was
of plain scratch paper, and although such a pad would
a
be commonplace equipment in an office (see People v. Banders,
p. 247 [294 P.2d 10]), it is not ordinarily part of
the equipment of a bar. Moreover, when Officer Sunday asked
to see what was in petitioner's hand, she attempted to conceal
and dispose of it. Although petitioner's conduct observed
Officer Sunday in the bar would not of itself constitute
reasonable cause to believe she was committing a felony, it
was sufficient to justify Officer Sunday's reliance on the information given her of petitioner's bookmaking. Under these
circumstances the evidence before the magistrate was sufficient
to justify the conclusion that a violation of Penal Code, see*Since in the present ease Chief Jansen did not know the identity of
the informer, no question is presented as to when, if ever, a claim of
not to reveal the identity of an informer may defeat the right
on his information in making an arrest or search. (See Scher v.
States, 305 U.S. 251, 253-254 [59 S.Ct. 174, 83 L.Ed. 151];
United States v. One 1941 Oldsmobile Sedan, 158 F.2d 818, 820; Hi!Z v.
supra, 151 Miss. 518 [118 So. 539, 540]; Smith v. State, supra,
633 [90 S.W.2d 523, 524].)
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that Officer Sunday had reasearch and seizure to believe that
and that therefore the search,
were lawful. (See Husty v. United States,
701
S.Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629, 74 A.L.R
One 1941 Oldsmobile Sedan, 158
Wisniewski v. United
47 F.2d 825, 826;
110 Tex.Crim. 646 [10 S.W.2d
725].)
·writ of prohibition is discharged and the
and McComb, J., concurred.
and Spence, J., concurred in the judgment.
J.-I dissent.
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in People
v.
Crim. 5758, ante, p. 106 [293 P.2d 52], I am of
the opinion that the search and seizure in tne case at bar
was unreasonable and therefore illegal and that the evidence
obtained thereby was inadmissible. Since the evidence so
obtained was the only evidence which tended to support the
charge against petitioner, it should follow that there was
no reasonable or probable cause to believe that she had committed the offenses charged in the information and a writ
of prohibition should issue to prevent further proceedings
against her.

